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Abstract 
 
The BRIDGES project was funded by the UK 
Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) to address 
the needs of cardiovascular research scientists 
investigating the genetic causes of hypertension as 
part of the Wellcome Trust funded (£4.34M) 
Cardiovascular Functional Genomics (CFG) 
project. Security was at the heart of the BRIDGES 
project and an advanced data and compute Grid 
infrastructure incorporating latest Grid 
authorisation technologies was developed and 
delivered to the scientists. We outline these Grid 
infrastructures and describe the perceived security 
requirements at the project start including data 
classifications and how these evolved throughout 
the lifetime of the project. The uptake and adoption 
of the project results are also presented along with 
the challenges that must be overcome to support the 
secure exchange of life science data sets. We also 
present how we will use the BRIDGES experiences 
in future projects at the National e-Science Centre.  
1. Introduction 
 
With the completion of the sequencing of the 
human and several other eukaryotic genomes, as 
well as more than a hundred microbial genomes, and 
the development of modern post-genomic high-
throughput technologies allowing comprehensive 
studies of mRNA, protein and metabolite 
complements of biological samples, the life and 
biological sciences are experiencing an era of 
exponential data growth [1]. These enormous and 
highly heterogeneous, distributed data sets require 
well-designed data standards for their discovery, 
linkage and further analysis. Grid technology offers 
a paradigm which can support such requirements 
allowing access to and usage of the large scale 
computational resources needed for comparison and 
analysis of such data sets [2]. 
The life science domain offers new challenges 
with regard to security that are not immediately 
associated with other domains such as high energy 
physics. Data or more accurately information and 
knowledge associated with these data sets, can be 
intellectually and commercially sensitive, offering 
considerable exploitation possibilities. Whilst large 
scale public genomic databases are sources for the 
wider life sciences community to access and use, 
numerous other data classifications exist in the life 
science domain which are not so freely available. 
The Biomedical Research Informatics Delivered by 
Grid Enabled Services (BRIDGES) project1 [3] was 
funded by the UK Department of Trade and Industry 
to develop a Grid based computational infrastructure 
to support the needs of the Wellcome Trust funded 
(£4.34M) Cardiovascular Functional Genomics 
(CFG) project [4]. The CFG consortium themselves 
were investigating possible genetic causes of 
hypertension, one of the main causes of 
cardiovascular mortality. The consortium involves 
five UK and one Dutch site (depicted in Figure 1) 
and is pursuing a strategy combining studies on 
rodent models of disease (mouse and rat) 
contemporaneously with studies of patients and 
population DNA collections.  
A characterisation and classification of the 
security requirements associated with the CFG 
project data sets was made at the start of BRIDGES. 
This classification evolved throughout the course of 
the project. In this paper we review the 
infrastructure that was developed and how it 
evolved to meet the needs of the scientists from a 
security perspective. The challenges in developing 
secure infrastructures within the BRIDGES project 
and encouraging their uptake are typical across the 
research community.  
                                                 
1 BRIDGES successfully completed in December 2005 and 
involved the National e-Science Centre at the Universities of 
Glasgow and Edinburgh, and IBM. 
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Figure 1: Data Distribution and Security of CFG 
Partners 
 
2. BRIDGES Data Classification  
 
At the project outset, it was identified that 
various significant data with different security 
aspects would be accessed and integrated to support 
the CFG research activities. This included:  
• Public data: data from public sources, such as 
SwissProt and EMBL. We recognised that these 
could be accessed directly or be held as local 
copies for performance reasons.   
• Processed public data: public data that has 
additional annotation or indexing to support the 
analyses needed by CFG. This kind of data 
must be held within the consortium, but one 
copy could serve the entire consortium.  They 
may be of interest to and made available to 
other consortia. 
• Sensitive data: the data about individuals in the 
cohorts of patients and the data derived from 
animal experiments. This kind of data would 
require careful enforcement of privacy and may 
be restricted to one site, or even part of a site. 
• Special experimental data: these data sets fall 
into a particular category, e.g. quantitative trait 
loci (QTL) or microarray data, which has 
special arrangements for its storage and access 
already agreed.  Given the cost associated with 
conducting microarray experiments and 
generating the data sets, these kinds of data 
would have security restrictions at the 
discretion of the consortia partners generating 
the data;  
• Personal research data: data specific to a 
researcher as a result of experiments or analyses 
that that researcher is performing. This kind of 
data may not even be shared among the local 
team.  The data may however later become 
team research data, e.g. once results have been 
published. 
• Team research data: data that is shared by the 
team members at a site or within a group at a 
site. It may later become consortium research 
data, e.g. when the researchers are confident of 
its value or have written about its creation and 
implications. 
• Consortium research data: data produced by one 
site or a combination of sites that is now 
available for the whole consortium. 
• Personalisation data: metadata collected and 
used by the bioinformatics tools pertinent to 
individual users. This data is normally only 
needed to support the specific user to which it 
pertains, but it may need to move between sites, 
e.g. when bioinformaticians visit sites or work 
together. 
The rich variety of data requirements is typical 
of the needs of a large biomedical research project.  
As a result of these classifications it was recognised 
that there would be obvious sensitivities about 
where data could be stored and how it may be 
accessed. For example, privacy mechanisms 
acceptable to the clinical researchers would need to 
involve access controls and it was considered that 
messages and certain data sets would need to be 
encrypted when in transit. It was considered that 
there would also be issues as to what data might be 
used by the BRIDGES software/Grid developers.  In 
some cases, the data may need to be systematically 
randomised, anonymised or encrypted, while 
preserving distribution properties, before it could be 
made available for testing. 
Based on this, different classes of integration 
were identified and were expected to be supported 
by the Grid infrastructure. This included integration 
of the many sources of data: public data, such as 
SwissProt, the mouse, rat and human gene 
sequences, etc.), project data, such as mouse, rat, 
congenic rat and human population phenotypical 
data (clinical data, RNA, microarray data, proteomic 
gel data, etc.) and derivative data, e.g. QTL.  
The Data Hub identified in Figure 1 was to form 
the fulcrum of this data access and integration 
activity, where public data would be combined with 
shared and private data according to security policy. 
Two versions of the Data Hub itself were to be 
created and compared, both of them based upon 
IBM DB2 technology [5]. The first based upon a 
commercial data integration technology solution, 
IBM DiscoveryLink and later remarketed as IBM 
Information Integrator2 [6]; the second based on the 
Grid communities open source Open Grid Service 
Architecture Data Access and Integration (OGSA-
                                                 
2 To be renamed as IBM Masala. 
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DAI) software [7]. An evaluation and comparison of 
these technologies including their performance and 
overall usability in the functional genomics domain 
was made and is documented in [8].  
The Data Hub provided a single repository 
through which access to numerous other federated 
genomic repositories and scientific research data 
sets could be made. The public genomic data sets of 
particular interest to the scientists included Ensembl 
(rat, mouse, human databases) [9]; Mouse Genome 
Informatics (MGI) [10]; Online Mammalian 
Inheritance in Man (OMIM) [11], Human Genome 
Organisation (HUGO) [12], Rat Genome Database 
(RGD) [13] and the Gene Ontology (GO) data base 
[14]. We note that of these, it was identified in the 
course of establishing the Data Hub that the 
programmatic access needed for the Grid data 
integration technologies was only available for the 
Ensembl and MGI databases. For the other data sets 
alternative solutions were required including 
downloading the data (often with no schema being 
provided), parsing the flat files and developing 
solutions to trigger the population of these files into 
the DB2 database. These issues are described in [8] 
along with the challenges and solutions that were 
adopted to handle changes in the remote database 
schemas.  
The Data Hub supported various client side tools 
through which queries could be issued and used to 
access these remote databases. Given that the 
scientists based much of their research upon results 
from microarray experiments, these queries were 
typically based upon returning all information 
associated with a given gene (or sets of genes). This 
information was dependent upon the schemas and 
data sets associated with the remote databases 
themselves. 
 
3. BRIDGES Data Access Client Tools 
 
The initial data access application developed for 
the scientists was MagnaVista [15]. This application 
provided a completely configurable environment 
through which the scientists could navigate to and 
access a broad array of life science data sets of 
relevance to their research. Specifically through 
MagnaVista the user could input the genes that they 
were most interested in. Based upon this input, 
MagnaVista would invoke a stored procedure on 
DB2 which would build up the query3, federate the 
query to the remote databases and subsequently join 
                                                 
3 The query was built using the GO database to address potential 
circular referencing that exist when querying multiple related 
databases, e.g. Ensembl data may include references to MGI data 
which references Ensembl etc. 
the results back together for display in the 
MagnaVista client application.  
Thus rather than the user manually hopping to 
each of these remote resources, a single query issued 
by MagnaVista was used to deliver collections of 
data associated with the genes of interest. To 
support the specific targeted data needs of the 
scientists, the MagnaVista application could be 
personalised in various ways. For example, users 
could select specific (remote) databases that should 
be interrogated; select various data sets (fields) that 
should be returned from those databases; store 
specific genes of interest, and personalise the look 
and feel of the application itself.  
The actual MagnaVista application itself was 
Java based and delivered to the users using Sun Web 
Start technology. Through launch buttons on the 
portal web page, a single mouse click could be used 
to automatically deliver the application and 
associated libraries, including the Web Start 
environment if it is not already present. However 
due to anomalies in Web Start with non-Internet 
Explorer versions of browsers used by the scientific 
community and issues of local firewalls blocking 
Web Start traffic, it was decided that a simpler 
version of this application was needed. It was also 
the case that the scientists were uncomfortable with 
the personalisation possibilities and having multiple 
panels and windows. In short, the application was 
not immediately intuitive and simple to use. The 
GeneVista was produced to address these issues. 
GeneVista is a portlet based application. Portlets 
are Java-based Web components, managed by a 
portlet container, that process requests and generate 
dynamic content. Portals use portlets as pluggable 
user interface components that provide a 
presentation layer to information systems which 
enable modular and user-centric Web application 
access. Through a portlet based approach, the issues 
in firewalls and problems with Web Start with non-
Internet Explorer browsers were overcome. 
In essence the functionality of GeneVista is very 
similar to MagnaVista. However, it does not support 
the richness of personalisation. We note that this 
was at the request of the scientific end users. They 
simply wanted to be able to select a collection of 
gene names and retrieve all available information. 
Few of them bothered with personalisation 
possibilities. A Google-like front end to GeneVista 
was designed to reflect this (top part of Figure 2). 
The GeneVista portlet simply requires that the 
scientist input the gene names that they are 
interested in and selects submit. Following this, 
HTML based data sets are returned and presented 
within the browser window as shown in bottom part 
of Figure 2. 
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Figure 2: GeneVista Basic Usage for Gene Query 
 
4. BRIDGES Client Compute Grid Tools 
 
In their pursuit of novel genes and understanding 
their associated function life scientists often require 
access to large scale compute facilities to analyse 
their data sets, e.g. in performing large scale 
sequence comparisons or cross-correlations between 
large biological data sources. The Basic Local 
Alignment Search Tool (BLAST) [16] has been 
developed to perform this function. Numerous 
versions of BLAST currently exist which are 
targeted towards different sequence data sets and 
offer various levels of performance and accuracy 
metrics. BLAST involves sequence similarity 
searches, often on a very large scale, with query 
sequences being compared to several million target 
sequences to compute alignments of nucleic acid or 
protein sequences with the goal of finding the n 
closest matches in a target data set. BLAST takes a 
heuristic (rule-of-thumb) approach to a 
computationally highly intensive problem and is one 
of the fastest sequence comparison algorithms 
available.  
It was recognised in BRIDGES that users should 
not have to learn the often complex options 
associated with job submission to job schedulers 
such as Condor [17] or OpenPBS [18]. In addition, 
one of the primary benefits of Grid technology is the 
ability to dynamically select and use a variety of 
heterogeneous resources is essential. This in turn 
requires that meta-schedulers are available that can 
dynamically schedule jobs across a variety of 
heterogeneous resources utilising a variety of local 
job schedulers. The BRIDGES Grid BLAST service 
which provides such a simplified BLAST based job 
submission system, enabling access to and usage of 
an extensible collection of HPC facilities is shown 
at the top of Figure 3 and is described in detail in 
[19]. This service was based upon the Globus 
technology (version 3) [20] with wrappers 
developed for external job scheduling systems. 
 
Figure 3: Grid enabled BLAST service 
 
The BRIDGES GridBLAST service makes use 
of the ScotGrid cluster [21], other HPC clusters at 
the University of Glasgow, Condor pools at the 
National e-Science Centre and all nodes of the 
National Grid Service (NGS) [22]. The status of 
these resources is shown at the top of Figure 3 and 
the user interface itself presented below. Intelligent 
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default settings are automatically selected for the 
users. 
 When used, the service checks what resources 
are available, where the jobs are best run and 
subsequently provides a prediction of how long the 
complete BLAST job will take to complete. In 
addition, monitoring of the status of the various sub-
jobs is undertaken (Figure 4) and staging of the 
various input and output files onto the compute 
resources is provided. Users can see where their jobs 
have been submitted and their status at any given 
time. 
 
Figure 4: Monitoring the Status of the GridBLAST 
service 
 
5. Grid Security and CFG Needs 
 
Fine grained security was essential to encourage 
the uptake of the Grid infrastructure by the CFG 
scientists. Most Grid solutions today are based upon 
X.509 certificates to support public key 
infrastructures (PKIs) [23].  
The central component of a PKI is a Certificate 
Authority (CA). A CA is a root of trust which 
holders of public and private keys agree upon. CAs 
have numerous responsibilities including issuing of 
certificates, often requiring delegation to a local 
Registration Authority (RA) used to prove the 
identity of users requesting certificates. CAs are also 
required amongst other things to revoke older or 
compromised certificates through issuing Certificate 
Revocation Lists (CRL). A CA must have well 
documented processes and practices which must be 
followed to ensure identity management.  
The UK e-Science efforts are based around a 
centralised CA at Rutherford Appleton Laboratory 
[24]. However the process of applying for 
certificates is off-putting for many of the wider less-
IT focused research community (like the CFG 
scientists) since it required them to convert the 
certificate to appropriate formats understandable by 
Grid (Globus) middleware, e.g. through running 
commands such as: $> openssl pkcs12 -in cert.p12 -
clcerts -nokeys -out usercert.pem which is often not 
available on Windows desktops as typically used by 
the scientists.  
We note that the UK CA now suggests for 
researchers with Windows based PCs that they can 
use a Windows openSSL based solution [25] but 
this in turn requires them to install and configure 
additional software etc. In some circumstances this 
is not possible, for example if they do not have 
sufficient privileges on their PC (root access etc) – a 
not uncommon practice in certain departments and 
faculties at Glasgow University for example. In this 
case the researchers will instead have to refer to a 
local system administrator to help with the 
installation and configuration. 
Assuming researchers have managed to obtain a 
certificate which they have converted into the 
appropriate format, they are then expected to 
remember strong 16-character passwords for their 
private keys with the recommendation to use upper 
and lower case alphanumeric characters. The 
temptation to write down such passwords is 
apparent and an immediate and obvious potential 
security weakness. The weakest link adage of 
security is exacerbated in a Grid environment. 
This process as a whole does not lend itself to 
the wider research community which the e-Science 
and Grid community needs to reach out to and 
engage with. It is a well known adage that the 
customer is always right. Usability and addressing 
researcher requirements is crucial to the uptake and 
success of Grid technology. End user scientists 
require software which simplifies their daily 
research and not make this more complex. Given the 
fact that the initial user experience of the Grid 
currently begins with application for UK e-Science 
certificates, this needs to be made as simple as 
possible, or potentially removed completely. 
Alternative solutions which do not require any user 
certificates are thus sought.  
There are other issues with PKIs and Grid 
certificates as currently applied in the UK and wider 
Grid community. Thus for example, security is 
typified via access control list approaches. In the 
Globus solution for example, grid-mapfiles are 
manually updated and managed based upon 
individual user requests. The dynamicity of this 
manual approach is also not conducive to the Grid-
idea for establishing new short term VOs. Instead 
users have to statically have their DNs registered at 
collaborating sites which have previously made 
available/allocated local accounts. 
The fundamental issue with PKIs however, is 
trust. Sites trust their users, CAs and other sites. If 
the trust between any of these is broken, then the 
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impact can be severe, especially since users are 
currently free to compile and run arbitrary code. 
With the now global PKI and associated recognition 
of international CAs through efforts such as the 
International Global Trust Federation [26], this basic 
trust model is naïve. 
Advanced authorisation infrastructures which 
support definition and enforcement of what users are 
allowed to do on resources are thus needed. One of 
the leading authorisation infrastructures today that is 
closely aligned with Grid development is the 
Privilege and Role Management Infrastructure 
Services Validation (PERMIS) software [27]. 
The PERMIS software realises a Role Based 
Access Control (RBAC) authorisation infrastructure. 
It offers a standards-based Java API that allows 
developers of resource gateways (gatekeepers) to 
enquire if a particular access to a resource should be 
allowed. The PERMIS RBAC system uses XML 
based policies defining rules, specifying which 
access control decisions are to be made for given 
virtual organisation resources. These rules include 
definitions of: subjects that can be assigned roles; 
source of authorities (SOA), e.g. local managers 
trusted to assign roles to subjects; roles and their 
hierarchical relationships; what roles can be 
assigned to which subjects by which SOAs; target 
resources, and the actions that can be applied to 
them; which roles are allowed to perform which 
actions on which targets, and the conditions under 
which access can be granted to roles. 
Roles are assigned to subjects by issuing them 
with X.509 Attribute Certificate(s). A graphical tool 
called the Privilege Allocator (PA) has been 
developed to support this process. Once roles are 
assigned, and policies developed, they are digitally 
signed by a manager and stored in one or more 
LDAP [28] repositories. When requests are made to 
access and use a given service, e.g. GridBLAST, 
checks on the authorisation of the user invoking the 
service are made by cross-checking with the signed 
policy in the LDAP service (in X.812 parlance the 
policy enforcement point interacts with the policy 
decision point). Depending upon the result from the 
policy, the decision to allow or reject is made. It 
should also be noted that if a given action is not 
explicitly allowed, i.e. included in the policy, then it 
is rejected. 
 
5.1 Advanced Security with PERMIS in 
BRIDGES 
Both the GridBLAST and the GeneVista 
services were based upon a fine grained Grid 
security model utilising the PERMIS technology. 
The architecture of the security infrastructure is 
shown in Figure 5. 
IBM WebSphere was used as the portal 
technology. 
 
Figure 5: BRIDGES Security Infrastructure 
 
5.1.1 GridBLAST with Advanced Security 
 
It is the case in the Grid community right now 
that in order to access large scale HPC resources 
such as those made available through the NGS end 
users are expected to have a valid UK e-Science 
X.509 certificate. In the experiences of the 
BRIDGES project, this was not something that the 
biological end users were comfortable with (and 
they did not do!). To address this, we provided a 
solution which did not mandate that the users have 
their own X.509 certificates instead we exploited 
X.509 certificates for the server on which the 
GridBLAST service was hosted. User authentication 
via username/password to the portal was supported. 
Once authenticated (logged in), usernames were, 
through the PERMIS infrastructure, used to retrieve 
the policies that applied to that user. This 
information was then fed to the meta-scheduler and 
job submission system. The BRIDGES project 
supported three policies: 
• If they are unknown users the job will only be 
submitted to the local Condor pool (we allow 
anyone access to the portal, however we restrict 
what they are allowed to do once there).  
• If we recognise the users but they do not have a 
local ScotGrid account the job will be 
submitted to the Condor pool and NGS.  
• If we recognise the users and they have an 
account on ScotGrid then the job will be 
submitted potentially to the Condor pool, the 
NGS and to ScotGrid (based on job numbers). 
Given that we do not mandate that end users 
have a UK e-Science certificate, but provide 
services which allow access to resources such as 
NGS through server certificates requires that 
detailed logging of user actions is made. We also 
note that since users interact with the Grid resources 
via graphical user interfaces for the services they are 
Proceedings of the First International Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security (ARES’06) 
0-7695-2567-9/06 $20.00 © 2006 IEEE 
not able to compile and run arbitrary code. This 
greatly simplifies the authorisation infrastructure. 
 
5.1.2 GeneVista with Advanced Security 
 
With regard to data security, PERMIS policies 
were defined and implemented restricting access to 
certain databases offered via the Data Hub to certain 
users. This was achieved through extensions to the 
GeneVista software to support queries of the 
PERMIS based LDAP policies. These policies 
distinguish CFG users from other users of the 
BRIDGES software. Specifically, the policies allow 
CFG scientists access to all of the data sets that are 
accessible from the federated repository. Other non-
CFG users are allowed to create accounts on the 
portal, however they are only entitled access to the 
remote (federated) data sets accessible via the 
portal. It is important to note that both GeneVista 
and the GridBLAST security authorisation are 
completely transparent to the end users. They issue 
queries and receive results without any knowledge 
that a security policy has been enforced and that 
they are potentially only seeing a subset of the 
complete data sets depending on their role. 
Through the course of the BRIDGES project, 
the richness of the classification of the data sets 
identified previously and how the infrastructure 
might allow for their secure sharing never fully 
materialised. It was and is especially difficult to 
convince scientists to exchange and share data that 
they regard as having value. Colleagues are also 
competitors and a philosophy of keeping data until 
research results have been published in journals 
remains. Whilst certain journals now require 
publication of MIAME compliant data sets for 
example, the data repositories are more likely to 
include older data sets. However it is the case that 
funding bodies in the UK are moving to a model 
whereby funding is given for life science research 
with the proviso that data sharing and longer term 
data curation considerations are incorporated [1]. It 
is only through changing funding models that 
scientists can be made to share their data since 
social, economic and political aspects of data 
sharing do exist (as demonstrated through the course 
of the BRIDGES project). 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
Security is fundamental to the success of 
bioinformatics and life science research. This 
includes both computational and data security. 
Experience has shown in the BRIDGES project 
however that usability is also crucial to the uptake 
and success of Grid technology. End user scientists 
require software which simplifies their daily 
research and not make this more complex. The idea 
of getting training on use of Grid software and 
resources or learning how to acquire and manage 
certificates and subsequently use them within a PKI 
is quite simply not something many scientists have 
the time or inclination for. Grid application and 
software developers need to address this fact.  
The BRIDGES project has developed real data 
Grid and real compute Grids which have taken into 
account real biological user demands and explicitly 
targeted ease of use with fine grained security. The 
BRIDGES services are helping to shape the wider 
UK Grid activities – for example helping to define 
the biological data sets being deployed across the 
NGS.  
It is a fact that the customer is always right. 
Whilst BRIDGES has developed much richer 
services in terms of functionality such as 
MagnaVista, end user scientists did not feel 
comfortable with these services hence simpler 
services have been engineered. Simpler and more 
intuitive user interfaces are crucial for the success of 
Grid applications. Similarly, solutions which help to 
overcome existing requirements on Grid 
infrastructures, e.g. possession of X.509 certificates, 
are required.  Why should a biologist need an X.509 
certificate when they only want to run BLAST jobs 
on available HPC resources? Such ideas are being 
taken forward in many other projects at the National 
e-Science Centre at the University of Glasgow 
where fine grained security is required, but client 
side software has to be trivial (and not include any 
complex Grid middleware. 
The experiences within the BRIDGES project 
have shown that scientists need to be encouraged to 
share their research data sets. Waiting until papers 
are published in journals before access to MIAME 
compliant microarray data sets are made for 
example is not conducive to timely research. The 
BBSRC funded Grid Enabled Microarray 
Expression Profile Search (GEMEPS) project [29] 
involves a collaboration with Cornell University, US 
[30] and the Riken Institute in Japan [31] and is 
addressing these areas directly. Establishing security 
infrastructures across these sites so that scientists 
can securely share their microarray data sets so that 
for example they can find who has run experiments 
and generated similar results. When such similarities 
are found, cross-site research into the relevant genes 
can be explored. Thus the scientists have to be seen 
to benefit from sharing of their data sets. Thus rather 
than feel they are “giving away” their data sets, they 
should feel they are gaining access to other data sets 
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instead. This change in paradigm is crucial for the 
success of any security infrastructure. 
The functional genomics domain has degrees of 
security, however the NeSC in Glasgow are 
involved in other more security focused domains. 
For example the Virtual Organisations for Trials and 
Epidemiological Studies (VOTES) project [32] is 
exploring Grid technologies for the recruitment, data 
collection and study management activities of 
clinical trials. This includes access to patient data 
sets. The Genetics Healthcare Initiative [33] at 
NeSC is also involved in linking genetic information 
from people across Scotland with their medical 
records via a Grid infrastructure. Once again very 
fine grained security infrastructures are needed to 
enforce access control decisions. This is pushing the 
boundaries of advanced authorisation infrastructures 
in the Grid domain.  
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